Abstract: This article focuses on the recent evolution of global policy agendas in two key parts of the communications sector: the internet and telecommunications. It explores the key regulatory governance ideas and practices that have come to the fore in shaping these fast-moving policy arenas. It sheds light on the ways in which selected global institutional contexts have played vital roles in shaping telecommunications and internet policy agendas as well as the resulting implications. In doing so, the paper explores a number of key junctures in the evolution of policy at the international level, highlighting the positions of 'Northern' and 'Southern' hemisphere states at critical moments of change. The article contends that sectoral internationalization in telecommunications and the internet has reinforced -rather than created a context for positive change in -the traditional order of North-South relations in these parts of the global information economy and society.
Introduction
This article focuses on the recent evolution of global regulatory policy agendas in two relatively under-researched parts of the burgeoning electronic communications sector: the internet and telecommunications. The main research questions guiding this paper are as follows: Which key regulatory governance ideas and practices have come to the fore in shaping these fast-moving policy arenas globally, and what has been the role and position of policy leaders and policy followers in this process? In pursuit of this task, for heuristic purposes, I utilize the distinction made in the literature on development between 'Northern' and 'Southern' hemisphere blocs to develop the analysis. Taking telecommunications and the internet into consideration, the article explores the policy ideas and practices that have become prominent as the internationalization agenda has taken hold. I place particular focus on the ways in which key (sometimes new) global institutional contexts have played vital roles in shaping telecommunications and internet policy as well as on the resulting implications. In doing so, I explore a number of key junctures in the evolution of regulatory policy at the international level, highlighting the positions of Northern and Southern states at moments of policy change. The evidence presented in the article suggests that sectoral liberalization and internationalization have thus far done little to alter the traditional order of North-South relations, where the former is policy leader and the latter policy follower.
The internet and telecommunications
While related and thus comparable (through their function of providing means of electronic network communication), the internet and telecommunications have very different origins and evolutionary histories, making the recent period of internationalization of each policy area interesting from a comparative perspective. For both Northern and Southern states, telecommunications has strong historical foundations at the national level. This influenced not only the developmental character of telecommunications domestically, but has also shaped perspectives on, and operational arrangements for, international telecommunication. Nevertheless, within the last 25-30 years, there have been transformative developments in the nature of telecommunications in both these respects across the globe shaped by policy agendas pursued at the international level. Here, the core features of the policy agenda originating from key Northern states that advocated liberalization and international market opening have been adopted globally, as witnessed in institutional contexts such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These processes have often been facilitated through regulatory cooperation aimed at learning the disciplines of neo-liberalism through policy diffusion as well as through the hard enforcement potential of its Disputes Settlement Procedure, as in the case of the WTO. Despite the remarkably broad adoption of the neo-liberal model for telecommunications worldwide through policy emulation, the role of regulatory competition has thus far been limited, as evidenced by the still predominantly 'inter-national' nature of the sector.
The internet, by contrast a much more recent development, has grown rapidly 'outwards' internationally from the USA. Although the task of developing a regulatory governance system at the international level has received a great deal of attention, it remains a work in progress. In internet governance, Southern states have played only marginal roles in processes of new institution shaping and evolution, despite moments of contestation, as exemplified by the debates on the future of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) process. A key institutional product of the latter, the multi-stakeholder Internet Governance Forum (IGF), although possessing innovative governance characteristics, has proven a relatively weak instrument for addressing this problem.
International policy agendas and telecommunications
For most of the 20 th century, telecommunications systems were organized on the basis of state-controlled and state-run service monopolies. The very timeconsuming and costly task of constructing predominantly cable-based telecommunications infrastructure meant that the reach and performance levels of telecommunications systems varied greatly, even within the economically most affluent regions of the world. The international character of the sector in terms of service provision was limited for the most part to commercial interface agreements between national telecommunications carriers, the rates for which were devised in a cartel-like fashion within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which also played a particularly important role in securing cooperation on the production of technical standards for international telecommunication. The telecommunication equipment production sub-sector displayed a more international character; for developing countries, this was often in the form of (ex-)colonial foreign direct investment and ownership (see Goransson, 1992) .
As has been extensively catalogued in the academic literature, over the course of approximately the last 30 years, this state-centric, monopolistic policy model for telecommunications has however been abandoned and replaced by one of regulated competition. Given the steady evolutionary history of telecommunications, this change has been both swift and extensive. The new policy model, like its predecessor, has clear ideological underpinnings, stressing the superiority of market forces in the delivery of communications services over public provision by the state, and is couched in the context of economic globalization (Cerny, 2008) . More importantly, however, this neo-liberal policy model in telecommunications has developed a clear set of structural and operational features based on the public regulation of a new set of competitively ordered telecommunications markets. The sources of change in telecommunications emerged, predictably, from the Northern hemisphere. The liberalization (through the introduction of competition) of regulated and already privatelybased telecommunications services in the USA from the mid-1980s was highly significant, albeit arguably far from path-breaking. However, the introduction of competitively ordered markets governed by a series of independent national regulatory authorities in the UK and then in the remainder of the European Union certainly was. Both the EU and the US subsequently played prominent roles in promoting the agenda of regulated open market competition beyond their territories (see below). Over the last 20 years what emerged as a trend has developed into a full-scale neo-liberal transformative movement, with states across most of the Northern and Southern hemispheres adopting a neo-liberal model of telecommunications.
International policy agendas in telecommunications -neo-liberalism, policy emulation and regulatory learning The World Trade Organization
The successful development of a policy agenda of regulated competition in telecommunications at the global level required focus on trade and trade-related matters. Here, its key advocates -the US and the EU -faced the difficult challenge of securing agreement in the areas of domestic and international telecommunications service provision among as many states as possible. Perceived as equally significant was the need to create liberal systems with few restrictions on international foreign direct investment in telecommunications services provision and indigenous service providers. Such efforts soon became an important part of the more general global trade liberalization agenda of the Uruguay Round of negotiations as part of the General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 1986-94, where there was a strong push by industrialized states for the creation of a trade in services liberalization agreement. This proved successful in 1994 with the conclusion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS was accompanied by the announcement of the creation at the beginning of 1995 of the World Trade Organization as a new global body for the administration of current agreements and the negotiations in future international trade and trade-related matters. In those negotiations leading to GATS that took place on telecommunications trade liberalization, Anglo-American technical or 'epistemic' experts were initially prominent. Their often arcane work proved important, since the "the very act of defining services transactions as 'trade' established normative presumptions that 'free trade' was the yardstick for good policy" (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992) . The US in particular was keen to see an effective forum-shifting of negotiations on international call settlement rates from the ITU to global trade forums (Huntley et al. 1989 ) and went as far as to propose the liberalization of international voice telephonic services, which was subsequently withdrawn because of lack of support (Fredebul-Krein and Freytag, 1999) . In fact, the GATS produced a significant, although in retrospect only modest, trade liberalization in Value Added Telecommunications Services (excluding voice telephony). Here, 48 states agreed on schedules of commitments to liberalize telecommunications services across the 15 categories defined as a consequence of the negotiations (Drake and Noam, 1997) .
The agreements made at the end of the Uruguay Round marked merely the commencement of a more aggressive push by the US and the EU to broaden the number of states committing to telecommunications liberalization as well as to extend trade agreements to include all telecommunications services, most notably voice telephony. In this respect, both parties aimed to "promote aggressively the transfer of ideas on telecommunications policy liberalization, so avidly pursued in their jurisdictions, to the global forum of the WTO" (Humphreys and Simpson, 2005: 132) . Beyond that, the two years after the inception of the WTO marked an intense period of negotiation in which the Northern states, in particular the US, EU, Canada, and Japan, dominated proceedings. This culminated in February 1997 in the landmark Agreement on Basic Telecommunications (ABT), where initially 69 states (later extended to 85) agreed to create competition in a range of telecommunications markets, including voice telephony.
The ABT was equally significant in terms of the adoption by 57 of its signatories of the so-called Reference Paper, whose elements became part of referenced commitments made by signatories of the ABT in their schedules of commitments taken (Luff, 2004) . The paper amounted to a framework of regulatory principles to be pursued in the process of compliance with the ABT, which aimed to give expression to -and to shore up -the agenda of regulated market competition and open market access in telecommunications. The specifics of the Paper are dominated by the agenda formulated by the liberalization forerunner states from the Northern hemisphere. Here, issues such as dealing with anti-competitive behavior, interconnection, licensing, and regulatory independence form the basis of a set of neo-liberal disciplines to ensure the enforcement of the policy model of international regulated competition. The Paper does, in contrast, commit signatories to maintaining universal service provision, albeit in a way that is competitively neutral (Blouin, 2000) and closely mirrors ideas on the articulation of universal service that already had been developed in Northern neo-liberal telecommunications systems. It is important to note that the commitments made to liberalization by each WTO member were not identical, highlighting the way in which the international neo-liberal policy agenda for telecommunications allows flexibility, albeit within clearly defined parameters such as those articulated in the Reference Paper. Particularly significant were commitments regarding voice telephony, the most widespread telecommunications service. Here, 55 states agreed to introduce competition in the local voice telephonic market, 52 states made commitments concerning long-distance voice telephony, and a further 56 regarding international voice telephony. An additional 42 states permitted resale of public voice services. In terms of the establishment of commercial presence to provide telecommunications services through foreign direct investment, 27 governments immediately, followed by an additional 21 mostly developing states by 2004, agreed to make liberalizing commitments (Drake and Noam, 1997: 803-4) .
It is interesting to note that while the US was arguably the most forceful player in driving forward the liberalization policy agenda in the WTO (see Singh, 2008) , the ABT -and in particular the Reference Paper -tallied very closely with the policy model developed by EU States for telecommunications. In this respect, a sense began to develop during the 1990s that the international policy agenda for telecommunications was developing into a framework of European style managed liberalism rather than all-out deregulated marketization (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992) . Overall, the creation of the WTO marked a highly significant moment in the development of neo-liberal international policy agendas in telecommunications. The goal of liberalizing international trade in goods and particularly services in telecommunications presented the WTO with a tailor-made opportunity to exercise its influence shortly after inception. In so doing, the WTO possesses hard enforcement powers enshrined in its Dispute Settlement Procedures. Interestingly, however, the ABT has been subject to very few disputes, providing an indication of the extent to which the systems of regulated competition entailed in the ABT have been complied with by signatories.
Since the establishment of the ABT, efforts have been made by leading industrial states to expand and deepen liberalization. The EU member states put forward a proposal that all WTO members "commit for Modes 1, 2, and 3 all sub-sectors and all modes [of telecommunications services] without restrictions … and include as additional commitments the whole Reference Paper on BT [basic telecommunications]" (WTO, 2000: 4) . In 2005, a number of WTO members, including the EU, US, Canada, Japan, and Hong Kong, urged all WTO members to make a similar call (WTO, 2005) . In the same year, the WTO intro-duced a new sector-specific negotiating mechanism for telecommunications. This is notable for articulating the goal of "working with least developed and developing countries to find ways to encourage new and improved offers and to provide technical assistance to support this process" (WTO, 2008: 1) . The new procedure made explicit the goal of ensuring that signatories commit to all elements of the Reference Paper. By the 10 th anniversary of the signing of the ABT, the WTO was able to report that 99 members had made commitments on basic telecommunications, with 82 of these having committed to the Reference Paper (WTO, 2008) .
The International Telecommunication Union
While the creation of key trade and market access provisions in the WTO as part of the GATS was vital in setting the parameters of the neo-liberal international telecommunications policy agenda, the agreements could be questioned in terms of their lack of detail and thus ability to deliver (Fredebul-Krein and Freytag, 1999). As noted above, the WTO possessed the potential to further embed the neo-liberal policy agenda through learning and 'socialization', though it also faced some challenges in so doing. Furthermore, the WTO was a new organization that had emerged from an often-fractious history of international trade negotiation, particularly between Northern and Southern states, in the areas of agriculture, and textiles and clothing. An interesting feature of the last 15 or so years of international telecommunications policy regarding this kind of activity has been the perhaps unlikely emergence of the ITU as a source of international organizational support for the reinforcement of the parameters of the model of international regulated competition. The recent role of the ITU can be regarded as highly significant for two reasons: First, it is a global telecommunications-specific body with a wealth of technical expertise, stretching beyond that available to more generic bodies historically more closely associated with the neo-liberal approach, such as the WTO and the World Bank. Second, the ITU is a relatively long-standing special agency of the United Nations and, beyond this, is one of the oldest international organizations, dating back to 1865 as the International Telegraph Union. It has a very large membership of 192 states, including most of those from the Southern hemisphere.
For most of the 20 th century, the ITU firmly represented that which by the 1990s had come to be viewed as the 'old order' of international telecommunications. It was essentially technocratic in nature, dominated by the state-owned telecommunications incumbents and did not strongly hold the neo-liberal imperatives of market-based competition and regulation. MacLean (1999, p. 151) Seamus Simpson argues that "before telecommunications became a huge, largely private, competitive, fast-moving, global business, there was no compelling practical reason for the ITU to be any more than a place where experts from different countries could meet periodically to develop the standards and regulations needed to enable the growth of 'inter-national' telecommunications networks and services". There is strong evidence that among the leading-edge telecommunications liberalizers, such as the US and the EU, the ITU was viewed as a major organizational impediment to change. This was clearly manifest in objections raised by both parties to the system of international accounting rates historically formulated at the ITU. These rates, upon which bilateral international call charges were settled by incumbent telecommunications operators, historically bore little relation to the economic cost of providing the service and, thus, sat very uneasily with the idea of market-based, regulation-framed international telecommunications. They did, however, provide developing economies with a source of much needed revenue. The system was also historically highly uncompetitive and dominated in a cartel-like manner by incumbent operators.
However, the scope of the Northern state liberalizers in altering the ITU's agenda from an impediment to a proponent of neo-liberal telecommunications has become powerfully evident. Key developments noted above in international trade negotiations, in particular the creation of a new global organizational context in the shape of the WTO, with its early expressed interest in telecommunications, exerted strong pressure on the ITU to embrace elements of the neoliberal agenda. The ITU began to view itself as in danger of being downgraded in status, if not bypassed, in the newly emerging international telecommunications policy regime. As a consequence, from the mid-1990s onwards, it began to transform itself into a body which not only embraced the international policy model of regulated telecommunications, but also acted as a firm promoter of it. A key moment occurred at the 1994 ITU Plenipotentiary meeting where it was agreed that membership in the Union was to be opened up to private sector interests (although the ITU now has as many as 547 non-state sectoral members from both public and private realms, the vast majority of these are from private capital deeply supportive of the agenda of liberalization). This weight of numbers, plus the increasing volume of the call of Northern states advocating neoliberal reform, laid the ground for a significant change in emphasis in the agenda of the ITU.
As developments proceeded in the WTO leading to the 1997 ABT, the debate about liberalization of the international call charging system continued apace. Here, the power of Northern liberalizing states proved decisive. The ABT mandated for its signatories international resale of telecommunications, thereby allowing new international telecommunications service providers to enter the market for international calling, in the process circumventing and directly challenging the international call charging system created at the ITU. However, a key problem for the EU and the US was that the adoption of international simple resale services occurred for the most part in the richest OECD states. Thus, the US, with the tacit agreement of the EU, introduced a unilateral system of individually targeted international call benchmark tariff reduction schemes in an effort to drive call charges down. Since then, international call rates have dropped significantly as a liberalized international calling market has matured.
In contrast to the fractious period of transition which characterized most of the 1990s, the ITU has been a key international player in the cementing and development of liberalized telecommunications for some years now. It has concluded a cooperation and coordination agreement with the WTO (Bronckers and Larouche, 2008) . Although it does not possess legislative or enforcement powers, its influence is arguably as important in other areas. Much of its work resembles that undertaken in the EU by the European Commission. For example, it has organized a series of global symposia for regulators. The latest of these resulted in the production of a set of best practice guidelines for the implementation and refinement of regulated competition in telecommunications. Focus was placed on the key regulatory problems which have become impediments to the business of trying to create effective international competition in telecommunications, such as open access to network facilities; network infrastructural upgrading to so-called Next Generation Networks; and stimulating access to new content-based services in an increasingly convergent, internet-focused communications network environment. The ITU has also regularly produced data on the evolution of the global telecommunications market in the direction of liberalization. Its Telecommunication Development Bureau, through a Regulatory Knowledge Centre, undertakes "the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on telecommunication regulatory trends and practices" (ITU TDB, 2010) . This focuses on the key range of indicators that have come to characterize liberalized telecommunications, dealing with such matters as the level of competition in key telecommunications markets; the existence (or otherwise) and characteristic features of regulation, in particular the presence of separate telecommunications regulatory authorities; the degree of foreign ownership permitted in key telecommunication markets; tariff policies; new service introduction plans; and criteria for establishing the existence of Significant Market Power. In providing this wealth of statistics from within its development arm, ITU-D, the ITU has come to act as major agent in the promotion and diffusion of the international policy agenda of telecommunications liberalization through regulatory cooperation and information diffusion. As Chakravartty and Sarikakis (2006, p. 69) argue, the ITU has affirmed the mes-sage "to implement a comprehensive reform process that would enable competition and technological modernization, promising to balance the concerns of equity with those of efficiency. In theory, this included the deregulation of the state-operated network with the ultimate goal of privatization, liberalization of the supply of services and the separation of the government's policy and regulatory arm from its responsibility as a network operator."
International policy agendas and the internet
In contrast to telecommunications, the internet is one of the newest aspects of international electronic network communication whose origins can be traced back to the era of the Cold War. The internet is unique in that for all states, arguably even the US, from which its key communications protocols -Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) -originated, it did not possess the kind of long-standing national 'centered-ness' characteristic of the development of telecommunications. Nevertheless, its initial development took place on US soil, using US financial, technical, and human resources. In terms of any future putative international policy agenda, this presented a strong agenda setting or first mover advantage to the US. A key feature of the growth of the internet was its emergence outside the mainstream of electronic communications. In technical, organizational, and cultural terms, it represented a potentially new and radically different form of communication. Here, two important dimensions are worthy of note: First, the social libertarian or communitarian origins of the internet's pioneer users led to a communications culture that eschewed proprietary market parameters and state intervention in equal measure. Second, and in contrast, as the commercial potential of the internet became apparent, economic interests from the broader ICT sector became considerably more prominent in the discourse and practices of the internet. For example, market liberalism, or more accurately, self-regulation free from state intervention was a strongly voiced argument (Simpson, 2004) . Key technical innovations that facilitated growth in the internet's user-friendliness precipitated it from the 'underground' of communications to a mass user system underlining this trend. Equipped with access to electronic networks, potentially any computer (or network) of whatever specification could connect and communicate. As such, the internet soon became envisioned as a tool with innate global communication potential and thus first order economic and strategic political value, where the role of the state should be marginal at best.
Such a vision, however, soon created a practical problematic which caught the attention of communications policy makers. Like all communications assets, it soon became clear that maximizing the strategic value of the internet required a global opening and a consequent sharing of its resources. At the international communication policy level, the search to develop a global system of governance for the internet thus became a high profile agenda item from the mid1990s onwards, one in which the presence of the state soon became readily apparent. Given its strategic importance, the debate on internet governance has often excited considerable controversy. Like in telecommunications, the international institutional context rapidly became an important focal point for policy debate.
The emergence of international policy agendas for the internet -contestation, legitimacy, and multi-stakeholderism The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
One of the most high-profile aspects of the debate on the internet has been the governance of its system of naming and addressing. This is, in simple operational terms, a technical and information storage and management set of functions. However, the system also bestows upon those parties in control of it the right to afford, deny, or modify access to individuals or groups of users to the internet. It also allows control over a vast quantity of key information on users connected to the internet. Given the growing economic, social, and political importance of internet-based communication and its perceived 'borderless-ness' and 'internationality', the argument grew that the system of governance of what have come to be termed the critical technical resources of the internet should be shared in an international organizational context among all the world's states. This, however, did not materialize as a result of a period of negotiation on creating a new international body for governing the internet's address system that took place during the mid-to-late 1990s. The process led to the establishment of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 1999. ICANN is a unique global governance body in a number of respects since, operationally, it is private and non-profit, and its relationship with states is at arm's length, through a Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). The most controversial aspect of ICANN, however, has been its unilateral oversight contractual relationship with the US government (through the Department of Commerce) (Mueller, 2002; Mueller 2010) .
Seamus Simpson
The establishment of ICANN according to this structure provided a clear illustration of the powerful exercising of US interests in the evolution of internet governance (Drezner, 2007) . In this respect, the process leading to the creation of ICANN was contested, though at the time was not illustrative of a NorthSouth division of interests with a familiar prevailing of the former. Instead, the period is noteworthy for the way in which an original high-profile alliance, called the International Ad-Hoc Committee, was by-passed by the US government in the process leading to the creation of what became ICANN. The IAHC, through a Memorandum of Understanding produced in 1997, proposed a nonprofit international body that would be headquartered in Geneva. However, the US government was concerned about the presence of the ITU in the IAHC and at that stage was still viewing it as very much an 'old order' state-dominated communications body (Mathiason, 2009; see Kleinwachter, 2004) . The period is also illustrative of the very limited way in which the EU was able to secure its interests in the creation of ICANN. In particular, it was only able to secure the creation of the GAC as a much lighter advisory body than it would have preferred; the latter's influence over the ICANN board has, however, grown over time (Christou and Simpson 2011) . Instead, the process leading to ICANN's creation was dominated by negotiations between US technical and business interests presided over by the US government.
Taken together, these features merely served to illustrate how far removed Southern states were from the initial process of institution building around the internet. As has often been the case in the development of key international governance bodies for economic and technical resources, first mover advantage lay with the Northern hemisphere, something which has set the context for the subsequent evolution of the debate on internet governance. The story of this differential access to a say in the evolution of governance of a key internet institution can be traced back, in considerable part, to a familiar technological lag in communications resources available to Northern and Southern hemisphere states in the internet's development. However, in the years subsequent to ICANN's creation, as the significance of the internet became increasingly apparent, the contested nature of this initial attempt to establish global internet governance arrangements also materialized. An area of particular concern was ICANN's jurisdiction over the country code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) system through which, by means of a two-letter code, each of the world's states is able to allow internet users to register their computers. Complaints over the legitimacy held by ICANN were raised by developing states, notably Syria, for example, regarding the potential ability to remove particular users and even a country in its own right should it so wish, from internet communication. South Africa, along with some other states, even expressed interest in having its coun-try code TLD re-designated to another international body and introduced legislation in 2003 that aimed to reclaim its name space from the then ccTLD manager (Yu, 2003) . Another major area of concern has been ICANN's GAC. Initially a select body, the GAC's membership expanded to 100 members by 2007, with many from developing states. At that stage, however, it was estimated by the GAC itself that only about 40 members participated on a regular basis. The GAC also allowed the ITU observer status at its meetings (Christou and Simpson, 2008) ; however, it was the exclusive contractual relationship between the US and ICANN which proved most controversial in the eyes of many of the world's states, something which by the early part of the last decade motivated efforts to multilateralize governance control of internet addressing. This emerged in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to an analysis of which in respect of its effects on international policy agendas and initiatives for the internet, the paper now turns.
The World Summit on the Information Society and the Internet Governance Forum
As noted above, as the 1990s progressed, the ITU began to take serious measures to reassert itself as an important global institutional player in electronic network communications. A significant part of this was to attempt to fulfill its role as an agenda setter. Although the IAHC Memorandum of Understanding, to which it was a signatory, proved a dead-end initiative, the decision taken at its 1998 plenipotentiary meeting to launch a World Summit on the Information Society proved more successful, though not without an unexpected and important twist: Having received UN approval in 2001, WSIS was organized as a twophase event to take place in the North in 2003 (in Geneva) and in the South in 2005 (in Tunis). Around the time of WSIS I, it became clear that the summit was going to be used as a platform for the rumbling discontent that continued to be felt about what was seen as the unilateral control over ICANN held by the US. Here, at one of the preparatory meetings for the summit in February 2003, internet governance 'moved quickly into the centre of the political debate' (Kleinwachter, 2009, p. 78) . WSIS thus somewhat unexpectedly became a process in which a debate on developing an agreed future global governance system for the internet, as well as the critical technical resources around its naming system, assumed a high and -as it turned out -controversial profile. The voices of developing economies were strongly discernible, a key source of dissatisfaction being the perceived slowness of ICANN at creating new English Language Top Level Domains to the exclusion of many new internet users from the South. The Brazilian government expressed concern about a potential loss of sovereignty through having to go through ICANN for the creation of any new ccTLD. A number of countries from the Arab world were concerned about the indirect ability of the US to remove their presence from the internet should it determine to do so. In a different way, a number of other states, notably China, were interested in being able to assert more control over users' access to the internet in their sovereign territory.
There were two important outcomes from WSIS I in terms of internet governance: First, states agreed to declare that "international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the Internet" (WSIS, 2003a, p. 7). Second, WSIS established the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which was given the task of producing a working definition of internet governance, highlighting relevant public policy issues around internet governance, and working toward creating a common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of a range of public and private actors in internet governance (WSIS, 2003b, p. 7-8) . WGIG was interesting in that it contained 20 governmental and 20 non-governmental members, each of which was afforded equal weight in the discussions and decision-making. According to Kleinwachter (2009) , this led the group to focus less on ideological differences and more on collectively finding solutions to the policy problems discussed. WGIG duly produced its report for the second phase of WSIS, at which decisions on the future of internet governance were to be taken. The definition produced enunciated that internet governance was "the development and application by Governments the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution of the Internet" (WGIG, 2005, p. 4) .
Although the lead-up to WSIS II strongly suggested that an important multilateralization of internet governance, and particularly one that related to ICANN, would be agreed upon, the reality proved something less substantial for the course of the international policy agenda for the internet. In the months prior to the summit, the US issued a firm declaration that its contractual relationship with ICANN would continue into the future and that the status of ICANN was not on the agenda for alteration as part of the WSIS process. Faced with this clear exercising of material power, and with continuing pressurenot least from civil society quarters -for some kind of multilateral institutional outcome, states eventually agreed to the creation of a new body, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The inability to create a new shared oversight function for ICANN also yielded the softer agreement to develop so-called enhanced cooperation, possibly leading to a 'new cooperation model.' It should, however, be noted that little or nothing in this respect has materialized since the conclusion of the WSIS II.
In fact, the idea of a forum was championed in WGIG by civil society, the technical community, and academic members (Kleinwachter, 2009) . The IGF was something of an experiment in global governance, in that it was designated by the UN as a deliberative, multi-stakeholder body in which all participants had in theory an equal voice. Meeting annually since 2006, it has the broad remit to discuss internet policy matters, though it does "not replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or organizations … [and is] … constituted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding process … with no involvement in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet" (WSIS, 2005, p. 12 ).
An important issue is the extent to which the IGF provides a context for the South to influence the development of international policy agendas on internet governance. Evidence appears to be mixed in this regard. It is interesting to note that at the WSIS II, states resolved to create 'enhanced cooperation' in internet governance. This very loose term served to embody many states' aspirations for increased say in the way decisions on how the internet would evolve were to be made. The first two meetings of the IGF in Athens in 2006 and Rio 2007, however, were organized such that "the management of critical Internet resources in general and the future of ICANN in particular came close to being a taboo" (Hoffman, 2009, p. 8) . Furthermore, the IGF is merely deliberative and thus any work that occurs on matters of internet governance is not permitted to result in even the provision of a recommendation, let alone a regulatory decision. However, it has been suggested that the cooperation undertaken in the IGF has contributed to a general acceptance of key internet governance terminology and has created principles adopted in ICANN's new accountability framework. Overall, Hoffman (2009, p. 13) contends that the "unique combination of institutional anchoring in the U.N. and experimental multi-stakeholder arrangement turns the IGF into a laboratory of transnational coordination that seems to work precisely because it does not draw on formal decision-making but the legitimacy of the institution".
The support of developing states for the creation of the IGF was contingent on their expectation that it would have a development agenda, which has, however, yet to materialize. Instead, development was envisaged as a cross-cutting theme, meaning that it tended to be marginalized (Drake, 2009) . The IGF failed to undertake any real debate on the activities of other large organizations such as the ITU, WTO, ICANN, and the OECD in addressing development issues regarding the internet. The Sharm el Sheikh meeting, however, did address development issues in the implementation of the WSIS principles, and open planning meetings in preparation for the 2010 meeting in Vilnius raised development to such an extent that a main session on it was included in the program. There is also some evidence of institutional emulation resulting from policy cooperation in the IGF. For example, regional IGFs have been formed in Latin America and Africa at the regional level and at the national level in Brazil. These IGFs are sites for policy learning but also policy coordination in preparation for future global IGF meetings (Kleinwachter, 2009 ). More broadly, and with regard to those WSIS goals related to development, a recent ITU report highlights only moderate progress in some areas -and very little progress in most -in relation to the position of developing economies. Connecting public institutions (libraries, cultural centers, museums, post offices, and archives) with internet access has produced an equal mix of 'medium' and 'low' achievement in key sub-categories. In terms of connecting health centers and hospitals to the internet, achievement has, for the most part, been 'low'. Although provision of internet access to governmental institutions in developing economies has produced 'medium' progress, provision of internet access to households is 'low' (ITU, 2010, pp. 16-17) . With a target date of 2015 to achieve the set WSIS goals, there remains much to be done in this environment of predicted sluggish global economic growth and reduced public spending.
Conclusion
This article has outlined the development of recent international policy agendas in two parts of electronic network communications with very different characteristic features, despite their obvious connectedness in functional terms. Policy change in both cases has occurred in the context of new technological developments and the attendant governance challenges posed in each case. Leadingedge technological arenas have historically shown very limited capacity for states of the Southern hemisphere to shape new and changing global institutional contexts, and telecommunications and the internet are no exceptions. First mover advantage in the global governance of electronic network communication continues to reside overwhelmingly with the North. However, although the heuristic employment of North-South is analytically useful, it is important to acknowledge its potential to be undermined by real world complexity. Most obviously, the concept is prone to geographical inaccuracy. More importantly, recent developments in the global political economy, notably the rise of the socalled BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) grouping (itself a contested label), point to instances where former developing economies' domestic and interna-tional economic policy agendas are likely to change as they pursue growth through marketization. However, as utilized in this article, North-South is able, for the most part, to adequately capture those who were policy leaders and policy takers in the cases of the internet and telecommunication.
The dominance of the North's policy agendas has manifest itself in the old and new institutional contexts examined in this paper, even those where it might be expected that developing economies could exercise a significant degree of presence in moments of contestation. In the development of telecommunications and internet policy agendas in the WTO and ICANN, as might be predicted, the material power and resources of key parties from the North has proven decisive. As shown, the internet is illustrative of a more complex politics than a straightforward North-South split. The creation of ICANN was not contested by Southern states because they were so far behind in the development of their internet infrastructures. Once they began to become aware of the importance of the internet, and specifically the significance of the internet's addressing system, in particular ccTLDs, they then began to contest ICANN quite vociferously. This in the lead-up to and during the WSIS I added to non-US Northernbased voices, including that of the EU, to call for the multilateral control of ICANN to be created through removal of the exclusive contractual relationship between ICANN and the US Dept. of Commerce.
However, perhaps more surprisingly, since the mid-1990s, the ITU has taken a remarkable neo-liberal policy turn which has ensured the maintenance of its prominence in the global telecommunications institutional landscape. In so doing, it has become a key adopter and promoter of the agendas of regulated competition in telecommunications led originally by the US and the EU and established in the WTO during the mid-to-late 1990s. Thus, in international telecommunications, policy agendas are characterized much more by regulatory cooperation and learning than regulatory competition (more generally see Radaelli, 2004) . Much the same can be said of the internet policy context. In the WSIS process, the subsequent 'soft' institutional context of the IGF (despite calls for multilateral governance of internet-critical technical resources to be created) produced a policy agenda only weakly influenced by the interests of developing economies. This is somewhat surprising since the deliberative nature of the IGF might have been expected to provide scope for Southern developing economy voices to be heard and agendas to be addressed to a greater extent than has been the case. Instead, while parties from civil society have been more influential, there is clearly scope for commonality between the interests of the latter and the developing world. The 2011 IGF was held in Nairobi and continued to build the presence of development issues and provided some evidence of these having been linked to broader civil society issues through workshop sessions on the role of libraries in development, innovation, and freedom, as well as a consideration of whether digital citizenship could "scale into the emerging and developing countries effectively" (IGF 2011). Hoffman (2009, p. 12) argues that "sceptics suspect that the ostentatious appreciation of the IGF's soft outputs is a mere pretext to fend off attempts to create a formal international decision making authority". Even if the status of the IGF remains unchanged, the forum is some distance from attaining cooperation involving strong input from developing states, at least of the kind envisaged through forms such as international regulatory webs (see Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) .
Overall, both the case of telecommunications and that of the internet illustrate the broad reinforcement of traditional North-South relations, rather than a change to them. This leaves considerable policy challenges on at least three fronts, for which there is some potential for progress. First, there is evidence from the North (particularly the EU) that the application of the neo-liberal model of telecommunication displays considerable variety at the national level. This suggests scope for Southern states in the process of economic development to tailor their adoption of neo-liberal policy agendas, at least to some extent, to national specificities, though it provides little or no capacity for the development of any radically alternative policy model. Second, strong efforts should be made in the IGF to address specifically the core aspects of development in any future policy agendas (see Kleinwachter, 2009 ). Third, it is important for states from the South to develop a stronger engagement with ICANN, in particular its Governmental Advisory Committee. Finally, as always, international-level policy decisions resulting in the deployment of as many resources as possible with regards to the WSIS digital divide goals would in turn affect recipients' willingness and ability to engage in the development of future international communication policy agendas.
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